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Abstract
This paper seeks to unpack and explain the relationship between the emer-
gency rhetoric used by Italian politicians and the policies implemented in Italy 
in response to the influx of irregular migrants from North Africa during 2011. 
It analyses how the language relates to the policies adopted and considers 
the impact on relations between Italy and the European Union (EU) in the 
area of migration. Accordingly, I address two main questions. How can we 
understand the emergency lexicon in relation to the policies adopted by Italy 
in response to irregular arrivals from North Africa in 2011? Secondly, what 
are the implications for EU-Italian engagement? In other words, how has 
the vehement and popularized emergency-centred debate in Italy affected 
interaction between Italy and the EU? 
To tackle these questions, the analysis is divided into five sections. The first 
section introduces the academic discussion on migration in Italy and focuses 
on three themes central to this paper: emergency, ambiguities in migration 
policies, and the EU as vincolo esterno (external constraint). The second section 
illustrates briefly the methodology employed and explains the selection of 
the case-study. Thirdly, I outline and examine the policies implemented by 
Italy between January and December 2011 and investigate the shifting langu-
age along the crisis-normality continuum. The fourth section turns to the 
international level and chronicles the relations between Italy and the European 
Union concerning irregular arrivals from North Africa. With regard to the latter, 
attention is given to the implications of the agreement between Tunisia and 
Italy. The domestic and international strands are brought together in the fifth 
section, which probes the reliance on discourses of emergency in the way that 
migration and asylum policies are presented vis-à-vis the European Union. 
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both the domestic and international domains. However, not all the policies 
adopted can be ascribed to the logic of fear alone, and indeed some actually 
run counter to the emergency rationale that shapes the wider political debate.
Keywords: Italy, European Union, Migration, Arab Spring, emergency
1. Introduction
As a result of the pro-democracy uprisings in 2011, hundreds of thousands of 
irregular migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers fled Libya for neighboring 
countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Niger, and tens of thousands more 
sailed towards Italy. Because of this large and irregular influx, ideas of 
invasion and emergency framed the public debate in relation to migration 
during the uprisings. Academics broadly agree that fear and misrepre-
sentation have characterized the stance of the EU as a whole, and that of 
southern European countries, such as Italy, in particular. The Arab Spring 
has amplifĳ ied the logic of criminalization and securitization that has long 
marked immigration debate in Italy and elsewhere (Carrera, den Hertog & 
Parkin 2012). The public attention framed by an emergency prospective has 
partially hindered an informed discussion (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 
2011 and Zupi, 2012). 
Against this background, this paper seeks to unpack and explain the 
emergency rhetoric in the language used by Italian politicians vis-à-vis 
the policies implemented by their government in response to the influx 
of migrants from North Africa in 2011. The aim is to test the notion of 
emergency by comparing the discursive constructions with the actual 
policies. The paper analyses the variations in the language and the policies 
adopted and considers how these afffected EU-Italian relations in the area 
of migration. In keeping with these broad objectives, I address two main 
questions. How we can we understand the emergency lexicon in relation 
to the policies adopted by Italy in response to arrivals from North Africa in 
2011? Secondly, what are the implications for EU-Italian interaction in the 
area of migration? In other words, how has the vehement and popularized 
emergency-centred debate in Italy afffected the interaction between Italy 
and the European Union? 
To tackle these questions, the analysis is divided into fĳ ive sections. The 
fĳ irst section introduces the academic discussion on migration in Italy and 
focuses on three themes central to this paper: emergency, ambiguities in 
migration policies, and the EU as vincolo esterno (external constraint). The 
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second section illustrates the methodology employed and explains the 
choice of the case-study. Thirdly, I outline the policies implemented by Italy 
between January and December 2011 and investigate the shifting language 
along the crisis-normality continuum. The fourth section turns to the inter-
national level and chronicles the relations between Italy and the European 
Union concerning irregular arrivals from North Africa. With regard to 
the latter, special attention is given to the implications of the agreement 
between Tunisia and Italy. The domestic and international strands are 
brought together in the fĳ ifth section, which probes the Italian reliance on 
discourses of emergency in the way that migration and asylum policies are 
presented vis-à-vis the European Union. Fear, I argue, remains a key factor 
in the site of ideas and policies across both the domestic and international 
domains. However, not all the policies adopted can be ascribed to the logic of 
fear alone, and indeed some actually run counter to the emergency rationale 
that shapes the broader political debate. 
2. Setting the discussion
The rich literature that, since at least the 1980s, has investigated migration 
flows to and through Italy is an apt reminder of the need to maintain an 
historical perspective when studying migration trends and policies in 
Italy. Migration flows to, from and through Italy have been investigated 
by, inter alia, Bonifazi (1998), Calavita (1994), Colombo and Sciortino (2004), 
Pugliese (2002), Zincone (2000 and 2006). Ample attention has been given 
to the role of media and public opinion (Diamanti and Bordignon, 2001), 
asylum and arrivals by sea (Monzini, Pastore, Sciortino, 2004; Coslovi, 
2007; Ambrosini and Marchetti, 2008; Hein 2010), integration (Zincone, 
2000 and 2001; Ambrosini, 2001; Campani 2008) and racism and criminality 
(Palidda, 1996 and Campani 1993). The same applies to the development of 
Italian legal framework on migration (Pepino, 1999; Livi Bacci, 2002; Caputo, 
2002, Paleologo, 2007), the situation in the labour market (Calvanese and 
Pugliese 1988, and Reyneri, 2010) and the Euro-Mediterranean context 
(Fargues and Fandrich, 2012; Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011; Cassarino, 
2012; Geddes, 2008). This academic output testifĳ ies to a debate that is both 
long-standing and diversifĳ ied. In the context of this ample literature, three 
themes are relevant for our initial purposes: emergency, ambiguities of 
migration policies and the EU as vincolo esterno. 
The fĳ irst strand centres on the notion of ‘crisis’, here used interchange-
ably with that of ‘emergency’. This debate is not new to migration. In fact, 
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some would argue that crisis is intrinsic to that debate. As Joppke puts it, 
during migration crisis Western states frequently end up admitting more 
immigrants than their restrictive policies would offfĳicially sanction (Joppke, 
1998: 11). The sense of crisis stems from a perceptible increase in the burden 
that migrants impose on the host community (Zolberg, 1989: 415). Based on 
this literature, the starting assumption of this paper is that the European 
debate on migration is skewed towards fears of crisis and images of a pu-
tative invasion from neighboring, poorer countries (de Haas, 2007). On the 
one hand, right-wing populist rhetoric is becoming increasingly hegemonic 
in European countries (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). The populist norm treats 
the category of foreigners as the single pervasive challenge to society. Two 
distinct aspects related to the employment of emergency lexicon are worth 
noting. On the other hand, “notionally restrictionist policies” are often in 
tension with an expansionist policy reality (Joppke, 1998: 18-19). As Castles 
eloquently argues, if measured against their stated objectives, migration 
policies appear to fail (Castles, 2004). One of the reasons for this relates to 
the misleading way in which politicians present their goals to the electorate, 
linked to the short-term policy cycle determined by the length of electoral 
periods. Geddes put it simply, “politicians may want to be seen to build the 
fortress because when immigration is a salient issue there are likely to be 
votes in seeking ‘zero immigration.’” (Geddes, 2000: 27). This leads to the 
second theme elaborated in the literature and at the centre of this endeavor, 
i.e. contradictions in Italian migration discourses and policies. 
As Zincone has observed, the Italian approach to migration is charac-
terised by a mismatch between the empirical functioning of immigration 
systems and the apprehension of such functioning by policy-makers and 
legislation (Zincone 2009). This relates to the dichotomy between “bene-
volent” practices that are addressed to expert committees and “low-strata” 
lobby, and malevolent ones that rely on extra-political domains (Zincone, 
1998). Italian immigration policies run on a dual track: on the one hand, 
increasing repression of criminal behaviour while, on the other, gradual 
extension of rights to immigrants (Zincone, 1998). As Pastore similarly 
noted, Italy’s tumultuous migratory system has been driven by economic 
and demographic factors, with politics and culture seeking in vain to catch 
up (Pastore, 2004). The resulting schizophrenia heralds good-looking 
pieces of legislation with concrete policy responses that have, however, suf-
fered from insufffĳ icient funding and an inadequate administrative culture 
(Pastore, 2004). Another aspect adds to this complexity: the relationship 
with the European Union, to which I now turn.
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A third major thread in the scholarly debate concerns the role of the 
European Union and, in particular, the domestic impact of EU obligations. 
According to a classic argument, the EU acts an external constraint, a vin-
colo esterno (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). Analytically, the concern here 
is with the structural power of actors and domestic institutions and how 
the EU reconfĳigures these in terms of interests and ideas. The underlying 
assumption is that diffferent domestic political structures “refract Europe-
anization in diffferent directions” (Radaelli, 2000). As initially propounded 
by Guido Carli (1993), the approach explores how the Italian technocratic 
elite employs an externally-imposed discipline to overcome the problems 
posed by the partitocrazia, the domination of government by parties. In a 
country characterized by entrenched impediments to reform, the EU-driven 
constraints – so it is postulated – act as catalysts for domestic policy change. 
This paper builds upon these three concepts in order to better understand 
the multifaceted relationship between the construction of the emergency 
discourse and the policies actually implemented. However, before turning 
to the empirical analysis, some words on methodology and case selection 
are in order.
3. The methodological and theoretical framework
In mainstream linguistics, the defĳinition of discourse analysis focuses on 
the semiotic interpretation of units of either spoken or written language. 
The emphasis is on the analysis of texts, detecting and tracing signs and 
symbols in their social contexts. In particular, from the perspective of 
“critical discourse analysis”, the concern is with the role played by langu-
age in producing power relations and social and political identities. This 
approach thus reflects on the symbolic representations of the written and 
spoken word and of power relations (Chadwick, 2000: 284). Overall, research 
into discourses combines the study of language use, verbal interaction, 
conversation, text and communicative events (Van Dĳk, 2011). In this paper 
I propose a minimal defĳ inition of political discourse as the sum of ideas 
articulated in the public discourse (Chadwick, 2000: 289). It is assumed 
that access to, and control over, certain discourses reflects and reproduces 
mechanisms of power (Van Dĳk, 2011). Embedded as they are in political, 
social and historical contexts, I look at how discourses conflate shifting 
voices and motivations and how they are reflected on policy decisions at 
both domestic and European level. The approach addresses the “polyphony” 
of texts (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 17) and their contradictions at the interface 
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between Italian domestic politics and European response. The employment 
of discourse analysis, with its particular afffĳ inity to socially situated power 
variables, helps us to understand and explain the relationship between 
the conjured exodus of migrants from North Africa and the actual policy 
response to migration flows. 
For reasons of space, I focus on the language used in parliamentary 
debates. The empirical section is based on the texts of Italian parliamentary 
debates accessed through the online archives of the Italian Parliament, as 
well as offfĳicial legal texts and ordinances. Material was selected on the basis 
of the pertinence to migration flows in 2011. The same applies to the research 
on the European dimension, which relies on offfĳ icial documents. For the 
sake of balance, primary sources have been complemented with secondary 
material, including interviews and public statements. Undoubtedly such a 
focus on parliamentary debates is not problem-free. Parliamentary actors 
have limited leeway, since migration is an executive-dominated area. In 
addition, given coalitional politics and ‘behind closed doors’ negotiations, it 
is difffĳ icult, in fact impossible, to capture all aspects of the decision-making 
process. Similarly, I do not look at other relevant voices such as media and 
non-governmental organizations. It follows that the analysis presented 
herein is in no way regarded as comprehensive. Having briefly defĳ ined the 
methodology, I now turn to case-selection. 
The selected case enjoys a broader representativeness while being 
demarcated in time. The so-called Arab Spring has unleashed profound 
changes, with far-reaching impacts on regional patterns of mobility. The 
magnitude of the migratory f lows that have accompanied the uprisings 
in North Africa and the protracted war in Syria testify to their historical 
signifĳ icance. Put simply, since 2011 the Euro-Mediterranean region as a 
whole has witnessed migratory flows as unanticipated as much complex. 
In the public debate in Europe and neighboring countries, notions such as 
humanitarian emergency and crisis response are becoming entrenched, 
even normalized. This is in stark opposition to the exceptional, ad hoc con-
notation that these expressions suggest. These reflections form the context, 
and explain the focus, of this paper. In relation to ongoing developments 
in the Euro-Mediterranean region there is a need to probe the relationship 
between the rhetorical employment of emergency vocabulary in relation 
to the policies implemented; and the case of the Italian response offfers a 
case in point. It is circumscribed in time in so far as the outflow from North 
Africa in relation to the crisis in North Africa in 2011 has now ended. Italy’s 
position is also emblematic because of its geographical proximity to North 
Africa, and its role as a transit and destination country. It speaks to a central 
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predicament of today’s migration management from the European point of 
view: that of responding in a concerted manner to unexpected and large 
scales migratory flows. The case of Italy lends itself to the analysis of the 
dichotomy between representations of extra-ordinariness and the routine 
nature of policy responses.
4.  The domestic level: unpacking the relationship 
between discourses and policies 
Since January 2011, migratory patterns to Europe and across North Africa 
have changed in signifĳ icant ways. Two types of movements can be identi-
fĳ ied, and the comparison between the two gives a sense of the extent of the 
supposed “migration crisis”: arrivals in 2011 versus those in the course of 
the previous decade. The fĳ irst movement concerns third country nationals 
who fled North Africa for Europe. Between January and August 2011, 52,000 
people arrived in Italy by boat from North Africa: 27,000 from Libya and 
the remainder from Tunisia (UNHCR, 2011). A comparison with the data on 
arrivals recorded over the course of the previous decade, when on average 
20,000 irregular migrants a year landed on Italian shores (fĳ igure 1), leads 
to one fairly simple conclusion: in the wake of the Arab Spring, irregular 
migration towards Italy has increased. It follows that arrivals in Italy by 
sea recorded during 2011 are high by historical standards. This applies 
specifĳ ically to refugees and asylum-seekers. In fact, the number of asylum 
requests submitted in 2011 was three times the fĳ igure for 2010: in 2011 34,120 
applied for asylum, while in 2010 10,050 requests were lodged (SPRAR, 2011 
and UNHCR, 2012). Yet two important caveats apply. 
First, these numbers represent a small proportion of overall arrivals in 
Italy. In fact, Italy’s yearly migration quotas have increased over the years. 
Interestingly, even the centre-right coalition of Silvio Berlusconi, which 
had won the 2001 election after proposing restrictions on migration, was 
forced to bow to the requests of employers’ associations for drastic increases. 
After a slight decrease in 2002, the 2005 quotas were three times as high as 
those for 1999 (Cuttitta, 2008: 47). The continuous rise in migration quotas 
demonstrates that the actual demand for labour in Italy has been much 
higher than political actors have been willing to admit (Pastore, 2007). These 
measures evidence the mismatch between what politicians say in terms of 
reducing migration and actual immigration politics. 
Secondly, irregular migrant f lows to Italy in 2011 represent only a 
fraction of those across North Africa during the same year. According to 
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the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as of October 2011 
about approximately 700,000 third country nationals had crossed Libya’s 
borders into Tunisia and Egypt, as well as into Algeria, Niger, Chad and 
Sudan (IOM, 2011). This reveals seemingly paradoxical trends. While ir-
regular migratory flows to Italy in 2011 were lower than regular arrivals, 
and limited compared to the movements recorded across North Africa, 
the internal political discussion focused on the idea of “emergency”. As I 
shall argue below, Italian immigration policies implemented with respect 
to North Africa transcend this unilateral framing and speak to a diverse 
range of interests and audiences, going beyond the emergency logic. 
Figure 1  Irregular arrivals to Italy by sea between 2000 and 2013   
Source: Elaborated from Cuttitta (2008) and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2013)
In the early days of the unrest across North Africa, the Italian government 
took action to address the looming “human tsunami” from North Africa. On 
12 February 2011, Prime Minister Berlusconi issued a decree establishing a 
state of humanitarian emergency in Italy (Consiglio dei Ministri, 2011) and 
enacted extraordinary measures in order to provide adequate facilities and 
deliver humanitarian assistance within Italy (Consiglio dei Ministri, 2011). 
Under the Prime Ministerial Order n. 3924 on 12 February 2011 (Ordinanza 
del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri), the Prefect of Palermo was ap-
pointed Special Commissioner with full powers to implement programmes 
in response to the emergency (Campesi, 2011 and Governo, 2011). To do so, 
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the Special Commissioner was provided with around 200 troops from the 
Armed Forces (Governo, 2011).
Subsequently, in a decree published in the Offfĳ icial Gazette on 11 April 
2011 Italy declared a state of humanitarian emergency across North Africa, 
in order to strengthen the humanitarian response there (Gazzetta Ufffĳiciale, 
2011a). Italy committed herself to “to engage in extraordinary and urgent 
measures in order to provide humanitarian assistance in North Africa, while 
ensuring the efffective fĳ ight against illegal immigration within the national 
territory” (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2011b). 
In addition, on 31 March 2011, the Italian Minister of the Interior tabled 
a plan to accept migrants who had arrived from Tunisia since January 
2011 (Senato della Repubblica, 2011a and Ministero dell’Interno, 2011b). 
As detailed further below, with resources made available from the Civil 
Protection Fund all regions were requested to take an active part in the 
reception of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers from North Africa 
(Libero, 7 April 2011). Another ordinance by Prime Minister Berlusconi, 
published in the Offfĳ icial Gazette on 24 September 2011, allocated €230 
million to tackle the “humanitarian emergency in the country in relation 
to the exceptional influx of citizens from the countries of North Africa.” 
The budget of the National Fund of Civil Protection included €46 million 
for the provision of shelters (Gazzetta Ufffĳ iciale, 2011b).
Legislation on the repatriation of third-country nationals was also 
revised. On 2 August 2011, the Italian Parliament ratifĳ ied law 129/2011 contai-
ning provisions for the implementation of European Directive 2004/38/EC 
on the free movement of EU citizens and for the transposition of Directive 
2008/115/EC on the repatriation of irregular third-country nationals (Par-
lamento Italiano, 2011). This law authorized the forcible removal from Italy 
of individuals not fulfĳ illing the requirements set out by the EU Directive 
on Free Movement and who failed to comply with an order to leave the 
country within a certain timeframe. Furthermore, law 129/2011 increased 
the time-limit for the detention of irregular migrants from six to 18 months 
(Amnesty International, 2011). 
Notably, however, despite the “migration crisis” in North Africa, standard 
migration policies continued to be implemented. This was the case, for 
example, of migration quotas and the European Integration Fund. On 
17 February 2011, the Italian Ministries of the Interior and of Manpower 
issued the decree on annual quotas, and 60,000 places for third-country 
nationals were made available (Ministero dell’Interno, 2011a). Similarly, as 
part of the initiatives funded by the European Integration Fund (EIF), the 
Italian Ministry of the Interior initiated the implementation of measures 
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to facilitate the integration of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers into 
Italian society (Ministero dell’Interno, 2011d). 
As part of the EIF, between January and September 2011, the Italian 
Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati (SPRAR) collaborated 
with Civil Protection to assist 4,865 persons from Afghanistan (13.7%), 
Somalia (13.1%), Eritrea (10.8%), Nigeria (7.6%) and Pakistan (5.9%) (SPRAR, 
2011: 47). Furthermore, as part of the Piano per l’accoglienza dei migranti 
envisioned in the Decrees of 12 February and 7 April 2012, the Italian regions 
provided assistance to 22,216 persons in the form of food, housing and 
healthcare. This was made possible by collaboration between regions and 
so-called “implementing partners”, including civil society organizations 
(SPRAR, 2011: 48).
On 17 September 2011, the European Commission granted Italy the sum 
of €27 million in co-fĳ inancing for the implementation of the annual pro-
gramme for 2011 (Ministero dell’Interno, 2011c). This fund covered a variety 
of activities, such as language training, employment generation workshops, 
assistance with accommodation, cultural mediation and intercultural 
dialogue (Ministero dell’Interno, 2011d). 
From this brief review, it can be argued that Italian migration policies 
in 2011 present numerous inconsistencies, alternating between short-term, 
emergency-oriented approaches and long-term ones going beyond irregular 
arrivals from North Africa. Indeed, the fact that not all the policies imple-
mented during and after the crisis in North Africa were of the former type 
is highly signifĳ icant. To an extent, this complexity reflects the domestic 
political debate, which tends to demonize and scapegoat migrants. To 
better understand the fuzzy relationship between discourse and practice 
in relation to notions of crisis, I turn to two issues that framed the debate 
on migration in response to the uprisings in North Africa: repatriations to 
Tunisia and the setting up of camps in Italy.
The fĳ irst issue relates to the repatriation of persons who had reached 
Italy by sea from North Africa. Notably, the Italian Right-wing party Lega 
Nord (Northern League) insisted on the repatriation of irregular migrants. 
This position emerges from the following quote by the Lega parliamentarian 
Lorenzo Bodega during a parliamentary debate:
The worry felt by many Italians, who fear the arrival of potential terrorist 
fugitives or mere profĳ iteers exploiting the confusion in order to land in Italy 
in the guise of refugees, is justifĳ ied. Maroni is therefore right to request 
support from Europe. This should not be used to facilitate the stay of abusive 
but should be used to encourage their repatriation. Lega Nord supports an 
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attitude of fĳ irmness, so that Italy is not overwhelmed by an unsustainable 
number of migrants (Senato della Repubblica, 2011b: VIII).
Unsurprisingly, Roberto Maroni, the pro-Lega Minister of the Interior, 
was a vocal proponent of bilateral agreements with the governments of 
countries such as Tunisia, as well as with Libya’s National Transitional 
Council. Upon the fĳinalization of the accord with Tunisia, Maroni explained 
that the measures would prevent clandestine immigration and thus allow 
Italy to “turn offf the tap” of irregular migrants from North Africa (Corriere 
della Sera, 5 April 2011). Arguments in favour of repatriation often made 
reference to a lack of European support. This position is summarized in the 
following statement by Sonia Vitale, Undersecretary of the Interior, before 
Parliament on 28 September. Viale maintained: 
It is the duty of all European Member States to help countries under 
particular migratory pressures such as Italy today, not only in terms of 
equitable burden-sharing but also with regard to the assumption of specifĳ ic 
responsibilities (Camera dei Deputati, 2011c: 4). 
As a matter of fact, the ostensible need for forceful action due to the absence 
of European support represents an element of continuity in the discourse 
of Italian politicians, one that features irrespective of party distinctions. At 
the same time, the emergency rhetoric served to galvanize attention and to 
secure extra support from Brussels. In fact, since the onset of arrivals from 
North Africa in the 1990s, both Lega and the Italian government as a whole 
blamed the European Union for failing to take a tough stance on the issue 
of migration and to support Italy (Geddes, 2008: 358).
The second issue regards the role of the Italian regions in the provision of 
shelter for those fleeing from North Africa. The government proposal to set 
up camps across Italy for migrants fleeing North Africa generated intense 
debate. Strong resentment was voiced by Italian regions and politicians 
concerning both the location and the type of assistance involved. During 
a parliamentary debate the head of Partito Democratico, Pier Luigi Bersani, 
condemned the Italian government’s slow response to a crisis which, in his 
view, was neither unprecedented nor unforeseeable (Camera dei Deputati, 
2011d). The President of the Italian Confederation of Regions, Vasco Errani, 
opposed the measure in so far as the “tendopoli” (tent cities) would be 
“unmanageable” (La Stampa, 2011). Accommodation in host families was put 
forward as a possible alternative. As the mayor of Padova, Silvio Zanonato, 
observed, regions like Veneto were in favour of a “tangible kind of solidarity” 
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whereby migrants would be hosted in small structures in diffferent towns 
and cities in Veneto (Corriere del Veneto, 2011). 
Eventually, the government made it clear that all regions, with the excep-
tion of Abruzzo (because of the 2009 earthquake), were expected to provide 
assistance and that “refusal would not be justifĳ ied” (Fatto Quotidiano, 31 
Marzo 2011). Yet the process of selecting the sites was dogged by contro-
versies. For example, on 29 March 2011 the region of Tuscany lamented the 
fact that it had been informed of the opening of a camp in the town of Pisa 
by the national media rather than through offfĳ icial channels (Camera dei 
Deputati, 2011d). These quarrels notwithstanding, Italian regions made 
space available to host up to 50,000 persons.
This brief review of the debate among Italian politicians sheds light on 
the complex relationship between rhetoric and policies. On the one hand, 
ideas centred on the notion of emergency informed the Italian policy res-
ponse to the crisis in North Africa, and to the irregular arrivals in particular. 
On the other hand, Italy also undertook a wide range of actions unconnected 
with any putative prospect of invasion by migrants from North Africa. 
In other words, notions of imagined crisis only partially capture Italy’s 
multifaceted response to the humanitarian crisis in Libya and the region. 
We are thus led to two of the central themes of this paper, those of crisis 
and of ambiguities instrumental to test emergency discursive practices. 
The crisis lexicon, which nourishes public anxieties, is partially at odds 
with the policies implemented (Zincone, 1998). Diverging interests and 
actors disclose a multifaceted policy milieu. These multiple dimensions 
of Italian policymaking have had a signifĳ icant impact on the country’s 
relations with Europe. 
5.  The international level: relations between Italy and 
the EU
In its interactions with Europe on the increasing migratory f lows from 
North Africa, Italy’s objective was straightforward. As the Prime Minister 
put it, in all its bilateral and multilateral exchanges Italy sought to “block 
migrant f luxes” (TGSky, 31 March 2011). In this context, the diplomatic 
re-engagement between Italy and Tunisia in 2011 provides insightful clues. 
On 5 April 2011, Italy and Tunisia signed an “exchange of notes” (Il Secolo, 
3 April 2011). While the full details of this agreement remain undisclosed 
at the time of writing, it reportedly envisaged active cooperation between 
the two nations, both to prevent irregular arrivals in Italy and to repatriate 
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Tunisian nationals (Senato della Repubblica, 2011a: vi). As the then Minister 
of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, made it clear, the goal of this agreement was 
to reinforce the collaboration between Italian and Tunisian security forces 
“in order to prevent the arrival of clandestine migrants on Italian shores. 
In fact the agreement envisions simplifĳ ied procedures for repatriation” 
(Camera dei Deputati, 2011a). For our initial purposes, two aspects of the 
agreement are worth mentioning: the issuance of temporary protection 
permits, and repatriation to Tunisia. Above all, they illustrate the extent to 
which the EU mechanisms and related emergency discourses were together 
used as a Trojan Horse for at least a temporary solution to irregular arrivals 
from North Africa. If nothing else, the emphasis on emergency served the 
purpose of appealing for extra help from Brussels. 
With regard to the former, on 7 April 2011 the Council of Ministers 
formally agreed to issue temporary residence permits on humanitarian 
grounds to Tunisian citizens who had reached Italy between 1 January 2011 
and 5 April 2011. The Italian Prime Minister signed a decree implementing 
Article 20 of the “Testo Unico” on migration. Approximately 25,000 Tunisian 
nationals who had landed in Italy during that period were granted tempo-
rary protected status and, in principle, free circulation within the Schengen 
area (Pascouau: 2011: 1). As mentioned above, this proposal initially met with 
signifĳ icant objections. The government had fĳ irst to win over its political 
allies, and especially Lega Nord, which saw this temporary protection as 
an amnesty in disguise. Eventually, support was secured on the grounds 
that the measure would alleviate the migratory pressure on Italy, inasmuch 
as it would allow Italy to act as a transit zone as opposed to a destination 
(Campesi, 2011). As Umberto Bossi put it: “I agree with this solution as long as 
they go to France and Germany” (Quotidiano Nazionale 6 April 2011, quoted 
in Campesi, 2011). On 6 October 2011 the temporary permits were renewed 
for a further six months (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2011a). 
As we shall see, this decision gave rise to intense debate at the European 
level. The dispute with France and the EU shows the extent to which the 
vincolo esterno strategically employed by Italy proved to be a double-
edged sword. Free movement within the Schengen area, which was used 
as leverage in the decision to grant temporary protection, led to negative 
side-efffects. Similarly, excessive use of emergency language was arguably 
intended primarily to secure extra European support.
The second aspect of the proposal entailed the repatriation of Tuni-
sians who arrived after the signing of the agreement. Between April and 
October 2011, 3,385 Tunisian nationals were returned to Tunisia (Ministero 
dell’Interno, 2011e). To some Italian politicians, the immediate decrease 
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in migration from Tunisia to Italy once the agreement came into force 
represented evidence of its success (Senato della Repubblica, 2011c: 18). As 
the Italian Minister of the Interior declared on 31 May, “the agreement with 
Tunisia is working. In fact since April the number of arrivals from Tunisia 
has been very small” (Camera dei Deputati, 2011b). However, the discussions 
with other European member countries were not unproblematic: the Italian 
decision to grant temporary permits proved particularly controversial.
On 11 April 2011, the European Justice and Home Afffairs Council rejected 
the joint Italian-Maltese demand to extend temporary residence permits 
for Tunisian migrants to cover the rest of Europe. The resulting disappoint-
ment felt by the Italian government was voiced by Roberto Maroni, who 
bemoaned the lack of support shown to Italy and questioned “whether 
there is any point in remaining in the EU” (European Parliament, 2011). 
From 5 April 2011 onwards France intensifĳ ied checks along the border with 
Italy and on 17 April blocked cross-border rail trafffĳ ic (Wall Street Journal 8 
April 2011). The French move prompted an immediate reaction from Lega 
Nord. Protesters from Lega demonstrated in Ventimiglia, arguing that the 
arrival of Tunisians was a direct consequence of France’s decision to attack 
Libya (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 4 April 2011). The diplomatic dispute gave rise to 
remonstrations on the part of Lega Nord. On 17 April, the Italian Ministry 
of Foreign Afffairs lodged a formal protest with the French government, 
claiming that the French measures were “illegitimate and in clear violation 
of general European principles” (The Guardian, 17 April 2011).1
To add nuance to the picture, it is noteworthy that the EU-wide approach 
to North Africa refrained from endorsing the “migration crisis” jargon, 
and instead advocated a broader notion of mobility. Following the fall of 
Tunisia’s Ben Ali on 14 January and of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 
on 11 February 2011, the European Commission (EC) made a commitment to 
support nascent democracies and to implement a comprehensive approach 
to migration. On 8 March 2011, the EC President, José Manuel Barroso, 
launched the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with 
the Southern Mediterranean”. This incentive-based approach involved, 
among other things, “Mobility Partnerships” to provide a comprehensive 
framework that would ensure that the movement of persons between the 
EU and a third country would be “well-managed” (European Commis-
sion, 2011). The overarching aim was to maximize the positive impact of 
migration on development while combating irregular migration. Specifĳ ic 
activities included visa facilitation agreements, labor migration between 
Member States and third countries, voluntary return arrangements, 
working arrangements with Frontex, and the conclusion of readmission 
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agreements (European Commission, 2011). By and large, in addressing the 
needs of emerging democracies across North Africa, the European Com-
mission sought to minimize the signifĳ icance of the “migration crisis” and 
instead to frame arrivals in Lampedusa as an ordinary affflux of irregular 
migration (Campesi, 2011: 1). Against this multifaceted background, an 
underlying thread becomes noticeable in the Italian context, namely that 
of an imagined crisis. 
6.  Likening domestic to international engagement: 
crisis as normality
The stirring up of alarmism about a looming migration crisis is not a new 
political device. Since they are bound up with broader processes of social 
change and structural socio-economic transformations (Castles and Miller, 
2003), migration and refugee movements often invite to debates centered 
on the idea of “crisis” (Zolberg, 2001). To an extent, party politics is the 
culprit. Fear-mongering and questioning of the stability of the system are 
intrinsic to electoral and party dynamics. To a certain degree this  explains 
the endurance of emergency-centered political approaches – largely at the 
level of discourse as opposed to actual policies – which are legitimized 
through a multitude of legal instruments and policy decisions. In other 
words, the shrewd utilization of powerful images of impending disasters is a 
well-established political tactic. These, however, remain merely “images” in 
so far as both migration patterns and policy responses reveal a more much 
diffferentiated picture, defying that of crisis. As demonstrated in the fĳ irst 
section, in the case of migration to Italy the available fĳ igures easily discredit 
the sensationalist representation of an invasion. In fact, the number of 
arrivals to Italy from North Africa was very low, not only in comparison 
with movements across North Africa but also in the context of annual 
immigration quotas to Italy. As the Commissioner for Human Rights at 
the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg, documented in the report 
following his visit to Italy on 26-27 May 2011, migrants from Libya to Italy 
make up just 2 per cent of people who have left Libya as a result of the 
conflict. Indeed, according to the Commissioner’s count, as of 7 September 
2011, 98 per cent of those leaving Libya crossed land borders into Tunisia, 
Egypt, Niger, Chad and Algeria (Council of Europe, 2011). This observation 
is relevant in so far as it contextualizes the idea of either a developing or 
imminent migration crisis in Italy. It follows that the relative magnitude 
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of migration as experienced by Italy, and by Europe as a whole, during 2011 
necessitates a critical reassessment of the notion of “crisis.” 
On the one hand, a number of measures reinforcing the idea of crisis 
were indeed put forward. Yet on the other, Italy supported measures and 
fĳ inanced multilateral actions inspired by a greater set of considerations. In 
turn, the mixed and contradictory emphasis on the “invasion” is implicated 
with the broader internal and international debate and serves a shifting 
range of interests. We are thus led to consider the complex landscape of 
agenda-setting and the multiple lines of connection between domestic and 
international realms. The mismatch between the discursive use of emer-
gency and policies implemented shows the deep-seated contradictions that 
have long been postulated by Zincone (1998). At the same time, attempts 
to use EU mechanisms as an external safety-valve - such as the recourse to 
emergency discourse to secure EU support and the issuance of temporary 
permits exploiting the Schengen area - present numerous  limits and are 
not sustainable. In fact EU-Italian relations have been characterized by a 
mixed-policy response. 
Italy expressed alarm about irregular arrivals from North Africa, and in 
the discussions with Brussels priority was given to actions serving to crack 
down on the flow of “clandestine” migrants. Notably, in the aftermath of the 
revolutions Italy was among the fĳ irst countries to seal agreements on migra-
tion with Tunisia and Egypt (Ministero degli Esteri, 2011) and, well before 
the fall of Tripoli, with Libya’s National Transition Council (Memorandum 
of Understanding, 2011). Yet elements of openness towards migration and a 
more diversifĳ ied migration response can also be observed. Beyond the os-
tensible crisis of irregular arrrivals, both Italy and the EU sought to support 
democratic transition across North Africa. Discrepancies between bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements, and between discourse and policy stances, 
persist confĳirming Italy’s “propensity for self-contradiction” (Zincone, 1998). 
The populist commitment to an imagined territorial identity – epitomized 
in the stance taken by Lega Nord as well as by the Italian government – 
remains a tactic (but one only symbolically efffective) of dividing citizens 
from ‘strangers’ and securing electoral leeway (Anderson, Gibney and 
Paoletti, 2011). Yet the mix of policies endorsed by Italy is as complex as it 
is heterogeneous. 
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Conclusions
The primary objective of this paper was to document and explain, at least 
in part, the Italian domestic debate and policies on migration during the 
political unrest in North Africa in 2011. The comparison between public 
representations of emergency and policies implemented can advance our 
understanding of crisis and migration towards an appreciation of nuances 
and counter-trends. Without embracing overly simplistic, Manichean ac-
counts, I contend that the prevailing discursive theme of politicians tends 
to champion the sovereign “right to exclude” as a means of confronting 
supposedly impending migrant invasions of historic proportions. Yet a 
close examination of irregular flows in 2011 in fact shows that the numbers 
involved are not unprecedented. Such an exaggeration of the scale of migra-
tion flows is far from being a recent tendency. A large body of scholarship 
has documented the mechanics of how, and the reasons why, states feel 
compelled to reafffĳ irm the shared signifĳ icance of national membership, by 
targeting irregular migrants who only account for a proportion of overall 
migration trends (Geddes, 2000 and Joppke, 1998). The interesting twist, 
however, rests in the connection between this rhetoric and the policies 
adopted. Although the vocabulary of crisis was used extensively to justify 
the passage of urgent legal emergency measures, Italy continued to enact 
initiatives that went well beyond merely limiting the irregular arrival of 
migrants. Policy-making swings between persistency and emergency and 
related ambiguities (Zincone, 1998) are a continuing feature of Italian 
migration policy. The same applies to the attempt to engineer policies that 
can make opportunistic use of EU mechanisms. For example, the reliance 
on emergency discourse in relation to irregular arrivals when seeking 
European support and the issuing of temporary permits can be explained 
if we approach the relationship between Italy and the EU through the lens 
of vincolo esterno. Strategic advantages could be secured by either being 
bound by, or seemingly against, EU commitments. In the process we have 
seen how discourses and policies are being redefĳined by the international 
dimension. 
An important corollary to this claim is that that the multifarious cycle 
of emergency rhetoric carries implications for, and is afffected by, broader 
foreign policy dynamics. Italy’s f luctuating stance, in calling for European 
help on migration while undermining the very rationale of the Schengen 
Treaty, exposes the fault-lines of Italian domestic and foreign policy. In 
fact, the opportunistic use of EU mechanisms is no panacea. It exposes 
domestic weaknesses and the concomitant ‘credibility problem’ vis-à-vis 
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EU partners (Dyson and Featherstone 1996: 11). To be sure, Italy’s fĳ ickle 
behavior and its awareness of being “last among the great, fĳ irst among the 
small” are enduring features of its century-long history in the community 
of nations (Bonvicini et al., 2011). Images of crisis complement and further 
consolidate these traits. 
While this paper has expounded some of the trends behind Italian 
political behavior during the so-called Arab Spring, several questions 
remain to be answered. More attention should be paid to parties at the 
margins, as well as to the role of civil society in either fostering or hindering 
contending emergency mentalities on migration. In questioning our initial 
point of observation and our underlying assumptions, we may learn a great 
deal about the political environment within which parties operate and the 
extent to which the politics of emergency forms part of a more diversifĳ ied 
tapestry of ideas and actors. 
Note
1. Despite these disputes, Italy and France found some grounds for collaboration. On 8 April 
2011, the French and Italian Interior Ministers announced an agreement for “joint air and 
naval patrols offf the Tunisian coast to block departures of irregular migrants from Tuni-
sia.” Reportedly, the new measures were to be carried out with the assistance of Frontex 
(Migrants at Sea, 2011).
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